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I. INTRODUCTION
Picture a person. What do they look like? Are they a fully-formed
human being, capable of communicating advanced ideas? A toddling
child? A fertilized egg in a petri dish? International human rights law
attempts to advance a recommended set of protections for governments to
follow when enacting laws for their citizenry.1 But what is a “human”? Do
human rights protections extend to embryos created in the course of
infertility treatment and stored in freezers for later use? If so, what might
this mean for assisted reproductive technologies such as in-vitro
fertilization (IVF), in which the creation and development of embryos
looms so large?
Granting embryos personhood has significant implications for IVF—an
area of medical practice that renders procreative sex2 unnecessary for
impregnation. IVF is an increasingly popular option for those who wish to
conceive a child.3 During the IVF procedure, an egg is fertilized by a
sperm out-of-utero; the resulting embryo is then implanted in the uterine
wall of either a biological or gestational mother.4 During IVF (and

1. International Human Rights Law, OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS.,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/InternationalLaw.aspx
(last
visited Apr. 21, 2014).
2. “Procreative sex” as used here refers to penile-vaginal sex between two fertile
people undertaken for the purposes of conceiving a child.
3. See CHARLES P. KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED
REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGY 91 n.1 (2d ed. 2011) [hereinafter Kindregan & McBrien]
(describing briefly the evolution and gradual acceptance of the in vitro fertilization
process).
4. See id. at 91. When the person carrying the pregnancy is also the egg provider,
that person is considered the genetic or biological parent. When the person carrying
the pregnancy is not the egg provider, that person is called the gestational mother, or
surrogate.
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procreative sex), a sperm that meets an egg creates a zygote, which is
considered an embryo from the moment of conception until about the
eighth week of pregnancy.5
Since IVF is about 35% effective at producing a viable pregnancy,6
medical practitioners recommend that those looking to conceive via IVF
fertilize several eggs at a time.7 The process of egg retrieval is expensive,
painful, and arguably dangerous.8 Thus, rather than repeat the entire
process each time, couples may choose to freeze “leftover” preimplantation embryos to use in the future, either to try for more children or
for use in case of an unsuccessful implantation.9 If embryos are granted
personhood status under the law, these “leftovers” could be considered
people, with all the rights that a person has under each nation’s
constitution.10 Disposal or destruction of these embryos would be
tantamount to murder, potentially for both the parents and the medical
personnel assisting in the IVF process.11
This Article analyzes the legal personification of embryos worldwide
through the lens of human rights treaties. Its scope concerns the preimplantation embryo—namely, embryos conceived as a result of assisted
reproductive technology12 for the specific purpose of in-vitro fertilization.13
Assertions in this Article are based on three interlocking assumptions: (1)

5. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 389 (9th ed. 2009) (“zygote”); see also
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 469 (9th ed. 2009) (“embryo”).
6. According to a 2006 study conducted in the United States. See KINDREGAN &
MCBRIEN, supra note 3, at 95.
7. See id. at 94.
8. Id. at 95; see also Carlene Hempel, Golden Eggs, BOS. GLOBE (June 25, 2006),
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/magazine/articles/2006/06/25/golden_eggs/ (noting
the potential dangers of egg retrieval, particularly during the donation process).
9. See KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 3, at 94 (discussing
cryopreservation).
10. Ashley Pittman, Assisted Reproductive Technology and the Status of the
Embryo, 81 MISS. L.J. 99, 99 (2011) [hereinafter Pittman]. Notably, but beyond the
scope of this article, embryonic personhood also has legal implications for birth
control, tax law, ectopic pregnancies, abortion, miscarriages, and stem cell research.
See id. at 101 (noting implications of embryonic personhood for inheritance and
custody as well); see also Ed Goldman, The Conflict Between Fetal Personhood Laws
and Women’s Rights, JURIST (Nov. 17, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/11/edgoldman-personhood-laws.php (discussing the legal implications of personhood laws in
the United States).
11. See Pittmann, supra note 10, at 100.
12. See generally KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 3, at 1-4 (providing a
general overview of ART in the United States).
13. See id. at 91.
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once rights are granted to a developing entity, they cannot be lost at a later
stage of development; (2) if a country declares that a fetus is not a legal
person, it likely will not grant an embryo personhood; and (3) if a fetus has
legal personhood at a young fetal age, a country may be more apt to find
that a fertilized embryo is a person. In other words, when discussing a
continuum of rights, a country is unlikely to find that
reproductive materials14 possess rights, then lose them, and then regain
them at a certain point in pregnancy.15
This Article analyzes the rights that are triggered when considering
embryonic personhood status through the lens of human rights treaties and
case law from both United Nations-based and regionally-based
international bodies.16 This Article argues that the very idea of embryonic
personhood is incompatible with the right to privacy, the right to life, and
the principle of non-discrimination. It further argues that in the absence of
an explicit pronouncement declaring IVF to be encompassed under an
existing human right, it can and should be included where treaty bodies
issue reports and recommendations on reproductive rights.
Part II introduces the concept of personhood and discusses the potential
implications of pre-implantation embryonic personhood on IVF and those
who access IVF, in addition to the reproductive justice implications of IVF
access. Part III analyzes the concept of personhood under human rights
law, concluding that current human rights treaties could be read either to
support or discourage legal personification of embryos, depending on who
interprets the treaties and which rights are emphasized. Part IV reviews
international personhood legislation, with a focus on countries that have
addressed cases specific to embryonic personhood. Part V briefly
addresses international bioethical pronouncements on embryos, and what
that may mean in the context of how embryos will be treated under human
rights law. Part VI synthesizes the overall treatment of personhood by
human rights bodies, and questions whether this will hurt or harm
burgeoning IVF technology.
II. THE LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF PERSONHOOD ON IVF
A zygote is considered an embryo from the moment of conception until
14. “Reproductive materials,” as used in this Article, refers to the immediate
materials necessary to create biological life (e.g., sperm, eggs, and the joining of sperm
and egg to create a zygote or embryo).
15. See Christina Zampas & Jaime M. Gher, Abortion as a Human Right—
International and Regional Standards, 8 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 249, 267 (2008)
(articulating a similar statement).
16. With the caveat that rights other than those discussed here could certainly be
triggered in contexts that are not explored in this Article.
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about the eighth week of pregnancy.17 Is this embryo a human being?
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, a “person” is “a human being.”18
Thus, only persons are “members of the human family”19 or “human
beings.”20 It follows then that human rights treaties cover only persons, but
at what point during development does reproductive material constitute a
legal person covered by human rights treaties?
As a question of domestic law in the United States, it bears noting that
regulation of assisted reproductive technology (ART) does not provide an
answer. As it stands now, ART—such as IVF—is legally underregulated.21 The status of the embryo is contested in the United States,22
and the only federal regulation that exists states that where embryo disposal
has been addressed under state law, the parents are generally allowed to
dispose of the embryos when they are ready to do so, as long as both
parents agree.23 Thus, under the few domestic legal regulations governing
IVF, embryos are not considered persons.24
International law provides a more complete answer to the embryonic
personhood debate. International human rights law outlines rights that
governments should protect and provide—and, in the case of governments
that have signed and ratified human rights treaties, which rights
governments are obligated to protect and provide.25 Because of the
17. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 389 (9th ed. 2009) (“zygote”); see also
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 469 (9th ed. 2009) (“embryo”).
18. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1257 (9th ed. 2009) (“person”).
19. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/217(III), at 1 (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
20. Id. at 1.
21. See KINDREGAN, & MCBRIEN, supra note 3, at 31-32. But see Lynn D.
Wardle, Global Perspective on Procreation and Parentage by Assisted Reproduction,
35 CAP. U. L. REV. 413, 416-21 (2006) (discussing both direct and indirect regulation
of ART in the United States).
22. See, e.g., Robin E. Sosnow, Genetic Material Girl: Embryonic Screening, the
Donor Child, and the Need for Statutory Reform, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 609,
625-26 (2012).
23. See Pittmann, supra note 10, at 100. A notable exception is Louisiana, which
has explicitly disallowed destruction of embryos and given them quasi-human status by
calling IVF embryos a “juridical person.” Id. at 101.
24. It is worth noting that the implications for embryonic personhood, particularly
in the United States where IVF is popular, are great. Embryonic personhood would
likely lead to parents or clinics not being permitted to destroy or freeze embryos. It
would also likely force clinics into guardianship status of unused embryos, causing
both financial and judicial complications. See Pittmann, supra note 10, at 101.
25. See What are Human Rights?, OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS.,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/Pages/WhatareHumanRights.aspx (last visited Apr.
21, 2014).
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potential for the destruction of embryos inherent in the majority of IVF
procedures,26 granting personhood to embryos would mean that embryo
destruction is murder27 and a violation of the right to life, among other
rights.28 Even if no embryos were destroyed during the IVF process,
embryonic storage and preservation would also take on a new hue, colored
by the fact that under this articulation, IVF would require the cryogenic
freezing of human beings.29 If an embryo is a person, and therefore entitled
to protection under human rights law, government allowance or regulation
of IVF may be a violation of international human rights law.30
A. Who Is Affected by Access to IVF?
The desire to become a genetic parent is strong for many individuals.31
26. See Pittmann, supra note 10, at 99.
27. See id. at 100.
28. Ostensibly, embryonic personhood could mean that embryos possess the whole

panoply of human rights possibly applicable to them, such as the right to health
(meaning embryos must be stored in such a way that they are kept healthy), the right to
non-discrimination (including its implications for Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis,
which allows for the selection of certain traits), and the right not to be held in slavery
(with attendant repercussions for the buying and selling of embryos).
29. Cf. Pittman, supra note 10, at 99. This is not intended to downplay the
possibility of a middle ground – where embryos are not quite human beings, but are
treated with more respect than non-humans. See Michael J. Meyer & Lawrence J.
Nelson, Respecting What We Destroy, SANTA CLARA UNIV. MARKKULA CTR. FOR
APPLIED
ETHICS,
http://www.scu.edu/ethics/publications/ethicalperspectives/respect.html (last visited
Apr. 21, 2014) (“The first false absolute is that it’s always morally wrong to destroy
human embryos, because extracorporeal human embryos [that is, embryos existing
outside the human body] have the same moral status as human persons. The other
unsound absolute is that it’s in no way whatsoever morally problematic to destroy
embryos, because they have no moral worth at all; in short, destroying embryos is
morally trivial. Fortunately, an alternative moral view to these two problematic
positions exists. On this middle view, human embryos should be recognized as having
modest moral worth. Consequently we must have serious reasons to destroy them, and
in such a case we must show respect for them when we destroy them.”). This is in fact
the case in at least one state (see Pittman, supra note 10, at 100-101, discussing a
Louisiana statute that elevates embryos to the status of juridical persons). This Article
instead seeks to explore how IVF could be affected by embryonic personhood, whether
juridical or otherwise.
30. See infra Part III for a discussion on the enforceability of human rights law;
see also Rosalie Silberman Abella, International Law and Human Rights: The Power
and the Pity, 55 MCGILL L.J. 871, 874 (2010) (noting that international law regarding
trade is highly enforceable, whereas human rights law is not).
31. See, e.g., Sydney Lupkin, IVF: When Insurance Companies Won’t Pay, ABC
NEWS (Oct. 29, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Health/couples-extremes-payivf/story?id=17575724 (discussing the lengths to which people will go to fund their
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Because science has advanced to the point where it is possible to conceive
a genetic child without procreative sex via IVF, the time has come for a
conversation about whether infertility – in all its forms – invokes a
corresponding right to procreate, and for whom. Though articulating the
contours of the right to procreate is beyond the scope of this Article,32 it
will address the reasons people may need or choose to use IVF to have
genetically related children. In this way, the Article will provide
information regarding the range of people potentially affected by the overregulation or restriction of IVF.
When discussing ART and the hierarchy of access to such technologies,
scholars have articulated at least three types of infertility: medical, social,
and elective.33 Medical infertility refers to infertility that occurs because of
a medical issue, while social infertility occurs as a result of sexual
relationships – either lack thereof or same-sex relationships – which render
an individual or a couple unable to engage in procreative sex.34 Elective or
lifestyle infertility refers to the process of the preservation of reproductive
materials for ART while still fertile in order to delay reproduction.35 As
expected, scholars are in disagreement about how certain procedures
should be classified, and which types of procedures should be covered by
insurance.36 Also, although it is beyond the scope of this Article, surrogacy
is a closely related medical procedure that is often used in relationship with
ART, and a brief explanation of surrogacy is necessary in order to clarify
how IVF is used in practice.37

IVF procedures).
32. It has, however, been explored extensively by other scholars, most notably
Carter Dillard, who manages to synthesize the majority of legal thought around the
procreative right. See, e.g., Carter Dillard, Valuing Having Children, 12 J.L. & FAM.
STUD. 151, 153 (2010) (analyzing whether a right to procreate is feasible and can be
supported by existing legal authority); Carter Dillard, Rethinking the Procreative Right,
10 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 1, 27-37 (2007) (situating the procreative right within
international human rights law and comparative law).
33. Irit Rosenblum, Being Fruitful and Multiplying: Legal, Philosophical,
Religious, and Medical Perspective on Assisted Reproduction in Israel and
Internationally, 36 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 627, 629 (2013).
34. Cf. id. (defining medical and social infertility).
35. Cf. id. (defining elective or lifestyle fertility).
36. See Lisa Campo Engelstein, For the Sake of Consistency and Fairness: Why
Insurance Companies Should Cover Fertility Preservation Treatment for Iatrogenic
Infertility, in ONCOFERTILITY: ETHICAL, LEGAL, SOCIAL, AND MEDICAL PERSPECTIVES
381, 381-87 (Teresa K. Woodruff et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter Engelstein].
37. See generally KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 3, at 151-56 (describing
surrogacy and its relationship to ART).

Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2014

7

Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 22, Iss. 4 [2014], Art. 1

788

JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW

[Vol. 22.4

Surrogacy, when used with IVF, is referred to as gestational surrogacy.38
During gestational surrogacy, an egg is fertilized with sperm outside of the
body to create an embryo, and then that embryo is implanted in a nongenetic birth parent who acts as the carrier for the pregnancy.39 This is
different from traditional surrogacy, where a couple or single person
contracts with an outside party and the outside party’s own eggs are
fertilized via alternative insemination.40 Surrogacy is the only way for
same-sex male couples to have children that are genetically related to one
of the partners,41 and frequently the law only protects gestational surrogacy
and not non-gestational surrogacy.42
Co-maternity (also called ovum sharing) is a form of surrogacy
sometimes used by same-sex female couples in order to allow both parties
to participate in the biological process of procreation.43 In co-maternity,
one partner’s egg is fertilized outside of her body using donor sperm, and
then the fertilized embryo is implanted in the other partner’s womb.44 In
this way, one partner is the genetic mother, and the other partner is the birth
mother.
Whether medical, social, or elective, the following people may seek
access to IVF treatments:
1. Single People or Couples Seeking Fertility Preservation
Fertility preservation occurs when people cryopreserve reproductive
materials – either eggs or sperm – for later use.45 People seek out fertility
preservation for a number of reasons. They may be transitioning from one
gender to another in a procedure that would destroy their reproductive
materials.46 They may also be diagnosed with cancer and seek to preserve
38.
39.
40.
41.

See id. at 153-54.
See id. at 154.
See id. at 152, 154.
Barbara Stark, Transnational Surrogacy and International Human Rights Law,
18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 369, 372 (2012) [hereinafter Stark].
42. Cf. id. at 155 (“Gestational surrogacy, although, legally speaking, a safer
alternative than traditional surrogacy, is not without potential complications.”).
43. See William S. Singer, Exploring New Terrain: Assisted Reproductive
Technology (ART), the Law and Ethics, 8 RUTGERS J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 918, 922 (2011)
(describing co-maternity).
44. Id.
45. What
is
Fertility
Preservation?,
REPROTECH
LTD.,
http://www.reprotech.com/fertility-preservation.html (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
46. See Laura Nixon, The Right to (Trans) Parent: A Reproductive Justice
Approach to Reproductive Rights, Fertility, and Family-Building Issues Facing
Transgender People, 20 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 73, 95-102 (2013) (providing a
nuanced discussion of the reproductive justice implications for fertility preservation in

http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol22/iss4/1

8

Paulk: Embyonic Personhood: Implications for Assisted Reproductive Techn

2014]

EMBRYONIC PERSONHOOD

789

reproductive materials prior to undergoing chemotherapy, which is known
to cause infertility in some circumstances.47 Other people may wish to
preserve reproductive materials at a young age for use at a later age when
they would not be as fertile, making it harder to conceive.48 Still others
may use IVF either because pregnancy is medically dangerous for them or
because they do not wish to be pregnant and instead wish to employ a
gestational surrogate.49
2. Same-Sex Couples
As explained above, same-sex couples are generally socially infertile
and, therefore, IVF is a method that same-sex couples can use to be
genetically related to offspring. In the case of same-sex couples, one or
more partners may also be medically infertile or seeking to engage in
fertility preservation.
3. Single People
Single people are also often socially infertile and may choose IVF as a
way to be genetically related to their potential child.50 Single people may
also be medically infertile, seeking to engage in fertility preservation, or
may prefer IVF to artificial insemination.51
4. Opposite sex couples with one or more medically infertile partner
This is the most common IVF story told in the media52 – an opposite sex
couple where one or more partners have fertility problems, but for whom
transgender people).
47. Fertility Preservation 101: Cancer Treatment and Fertility Risks, REPROTECH
LTD, http://www.reprotech.com/fertility-preservation-101.html (last visited Apr. 21,
2014).
48. See Engelstein, supra note 36, at 381.
49. See Mayo Clinic Staff, In Vitro Fertilization (IFV): Why It’s Done, MAYO
CLINIC (June 27, 2013), http://www.mayoclinic.org/tests-procedures/in-vitrofertilization/basics/why-its-done/prc-20018905 [hereinafter Mayo Clinic Staff]
(explaining the different health conditions a woman or man might have that would lead
them to utilize IVF).
50. See Cosima Marriner, ‘Socially Infertile’ Thirtysomethings Turn to IVF,
MONASH
IVF
(Nov.
13,
2012),
http://monashivf.com/socially-infertilethirtysomethings-turn-to-ivf/ (defining “socially infertile” as a woman who turns to
IVF to conceive instead of waiting to find a partner).
51. See Mayo Clinic Staff, supra note 49 (noting that women who are about to
start cancer treatment or who do not have a functional uterus may want to preserve
their eggs for future use).
52. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Transformative Reproduction, 16 J. GENDER RACE
& JUST. 187, 187 (2013) [hereinafter Mutcherson].
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IVF may be an option to still have a child that is genetically related to one
or both of the partners. This narrow conception of who needs access to
IVF is actively harmful to a complete discussion of what the law might
“owe to people who seek parenthood through ART.”53 A bigger picture
regarding who barriers to accessing IVF will affect is important for
understanding the types of human rights violations embryonic personhood
may represent. By using the framework of reproductive justice, this Article
considers embryonic personhood and IVF as issues that affect a number of
marginalized populations with great consequence.54
B. Access to IVF as a Reproductive Justice Issue
Reproductive justice (RJ) is a conceptual framework developed by
women of color activists in the United States,55 and provides a way to view
reproductive health and rights through an intersectional56 lens. Viewing
reproductive health and rights as impacted by personal and group identities
– that is, through the reproductive justice framework – helps to situate these
concepts more clearly in a human rights context. By taking intersectional
identities into account, reproductive justice illuminates the variety of
human rights classifications that are applicable to situations such as access
to IVF.57
The traditional reproductive rights and health movements within the
human rights field – both national and international – often overlook or
ignore the premise that rights without access mean very little to a majority
of the population.58 In response to this limited view of the problems facing,

53. Id. at 190.
54. And for this the author owes a great debt to Professor Kimberly M.

Mutcherson and her trailblazing article, Transformative Reproduction, which set a high
bar for how to talk about ART as a reproductive justice issue. See id.
55. LAW STUDENTS FOR REPROD. JUSTICE, WHAT IS REPRODUCTIVE JUSTICE? 1 n.1,
available at http://lsrj.org/documents/resources/What%20is%20RJ.pdf [hereinafter
LAW STUDENTS FOR REPROD. JUSTICE.
56. Intersectionality is the concept that the identities a person holds may impact
their experiences. In effect, an intersectional lens recognizes the way that identities,
such as race, class, gender, sex, sexual orientation, ability, and immigration status] may
impact reproductive “access, agency, and autonomy.” Id. at 1.
57. Cf. Cynthia Soohoo & Suzanne Stolz, Bringing Theories of Human Rights
Change Home, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 459, 480-82 (2008) (providing a number of
examples of how arguments for reproductive rights are more expansive and progressive
when contextualized in a human rights framework).
58. Cf. Loretta Ross, Understanding Reproductive Justice: Transforming the ProChoice Movement, 36 OFF OUR BACKS 14, 14 (2006) (noting that reproductive justice
advocates “fight for the necessary enabling conditions to realize [the right to have a
child, the right not to have a child, and the right to parent the children we have, as well
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in particular, poor women and women of color, women of color activists
combined reproductive health and social justice principles to create the
term “reproductive justice.”59 Reproductive justice “will exist when all
people can exercise the rights and access the resources they need to thrive
and to decide whether, when, and how to have and parent children with
dignity, free from discrimination, coercion, or violence.”60 Therefore,
under RJ principles, all people who want to use IVF as a method of
procreation – the “how” of the previous definition – should be allowed
access, including funding as necessary, to IVF treatments. Currently, this
access – like the right to procreate – is limited by competing concerns.61
As we move forward into the brave new world of reproductive
technologies, RJ requires that we ask whether these technologies “enhance
or oppress,”62 or both.
Access to IVF as an RJ issue means that people seeking IVF should not
be seen in a vacuum63 – they may be infertile, single, part of a same-sex
couple, or wishing to engage in fertility preservation for any number of
reasons, such as a plan to undergo a surgical gender transition, or a need to
undergo chemotherapy. Additionally, individuals may lack access to IVF
due to cost or discrimination, among other things.64 RJ requires that the
resources necessary for individuals to experience full reproductive
autonomy and dignity are available, and this includes access to IVF and
other ART.65
as the right to control our birthing options, such as midwifery]”).
59. LAW STUDENTS FOR REPROD. JUSTICE, supra note 55, at 1 n.1.
60. Id. at 1.
61. Concerns include the medical safety of ART and ethics questions ART poses,
such as the regulation/allowance of transnational surrogacy arrangements. See
Mutcherson, supra note 52, at 203.
62. Id. at 206; see also id. at 220-24 (exploring the notion of ART as reproductive
oppression as part of a full discussion of the potential for ART to create both
reproductive justice and reproductive oppression).
63. See id. at 199-200 (citation omitted) (“The hierarchies of the past persist when
society elevates the reproductive acts of those with race, class, and sexual orientation
privilege above the reproductive acts of those who lack any or all such privileges.
Having a child, coitally or non-coitally, implicates race, gender, social status,
immigration status, class, marital status, and a variety of other axes of social standing.
This was the case when coital reproduction was the only way to make babies and it
continues to be the case as more people have children through non-coital means of
reproduction. Within this framework, it is critical to understand and evaluate how
categories of difference are salient in non-coital reproduction.”).
64. See, e.g., id. at 200-204 (discussing cost as a barrier to accessing ART).
65. See generally LAW STUDENTS FOR REPROD. JUSTICE, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE
TECHNOLOGY
(2013),
available
at
http://lsrj.org/documents/factsheets/13_Assisted_Repro_Technology.pdf. However, RJ
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The human rights of privacy, access to information, health, to benefit
from advances in science and technology, to found a family (procreate),
and reproductive rights in general can all be invoked under a variety of
human rights treaties when discussing access to IVF. Depending on the
identities of the person or people involved in accessing IVF, a number of
human rights treaties may be appropriate, including the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities,66 the Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination Against Women,67 the American Convention
on Human Rights,68 or a number of other treaties. Though not all of these
rights and treaties are analyzed below, RJ principles are an illustration of
the wide variety of approaches human rights provides for analyzing access
to IVF.

principles would not endorse someone receiving access to IVF “on the backs” of
others, as detailed in a number of excellent articles exploring problems with surrogacy,
most notably transnational surrogacy. See Seema Mohapatra, Achieving Reproductive
Justice in the International Surrogacy Market, 21 ANNALS HEALTH L. 190, 191 (2012);
Mutcherson, supra note 52, at 203-04 (citing Nicole Bromfield, Global Surrogacy in
India: Legal, Ethical and Human Rights Implications of a Growing “Industry,” RH
REALITY
CHECK
(June
11,
2010,
9:00
AM),
http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/blog/2010/06/10/stateless-babies-legal-ethical-humanrights-issues-raised-growth-global-surrogacy-india); Miriam Perez, Surrogacy: The
Next Frontier for Reproductive Justice, RH REALITY CHECK (Feb. 23, 2010, 6:00 AM),
http://www.rhrealitycheck.org/blog/2010/02/23/surrogacy-next-frontier-reproductivejustice; see also Richard F. Storrow, Quests for Conception: Fertility Tourists,
Globalization and Feminist Legal Theory, 57 HASTINGS L.J. 295, 327 (2005). See
generally Heather Widdows, Border Disputes Across Bodies: Exploitation in
Trafficking for Prostitution and Egg Sale for Stem Cell Research, 2 INT’L J. FEMINIST
APPROACHES TO BIOETHICS 5 (2009) (asserting that egg “donation” is an exploitive
practice that should not be endorsed by feminists).
66. See Dr. Maya Sabatello, Who’s Got Parental Rights? The Intersection
Between Infertility, Reproductive Technologies, and Disability Rights Law, 6 L.
HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL J. 227, 255-58 (2010) (citing Convention on the Rights of
Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/106, Annex I, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., Supp.
No. 49, at 65, U.N. Doc. A/61/49 (2006), entered into force May 3, 2008, available at
http://www.un.org/disabilities/default.asp?id=259) (discussing ART in the context of
the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities).
67. See Stark, supra note 41, at 379-80 (discussing how the Committee on the
Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) is implicated in gestational
surrogacy arrangements).
68. See discussion infra Part IV: B on how the American Convention of Human
Rights has been used to articulate the denial of IVF as a violation of human rights.
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III. PERSONHOOD IN HUMAN RIGHTS TREATIES
A. How Does International Human Rights Law Work?
Since there is no “world government,” nation-states have come together
since 194869 in an attempt to establish governing international norms in
regards to basic rights possessed by all individuals. What follows is a brief
overview of the international human rights law process as carried out by
the United Nations (UN).
Codified human rights are born through treaty processes: states draft a
document setting forth a group of rights, and then the document is formally
presented for signature.70 A signature is an expression to be bound by a
treaty.71 However, a state is not bound by a treaty until the treaty is
ratified, and even then a sufficient number of state parties must ratify the
treaty before the treaty becomes binding.72 The ratification process
typically requires that the treaty go through the legislative process of the
signing country, and, once approved, the treaty becomes binding law on
that country.73 In some instances, states may help to draft a document but
then refuse to sign it because they consider the final language used to
articulate the rights unsatisfactory.74 In other instances, states may sign,
but never ratify, a document. Although signatory states are expected to
comply with treaties, they are not legally bound to follow them—unlike
states that have ratified the treaties.75

69. See Mary Ann Glendon, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, 2 NW. U. J. INT’L HUM. RTS. 1, 1 (2004).
70. See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, HUMAN RIGHTS HERE AND NOW:
CELEBRATING THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Nancy Flowers ed.,
1998),
available
at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part-1/fromconcept.htm [hereinafter AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL].
71. JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: DILEMMAS IN WORLD
POLITICS 5 (4th ed. 2013) [hereinafter DONNELLY].
72. Id.
73. See id. (explaining that in the United States, the president signs a treaty, which
then must go to the Senate for ratification).
74. The United States is notorious for helping to draft and subsequently refusing to
sign human rights documents. See, e.g., Cormac T. Connor, Human Rights Violations
in the Information Age, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 207, 230 (2001) (“In 1953, Secretary of
State John Foster Dulles asserted that the United States did not intend to ratify any
international human rights treaties. Official antipathy to international human rights
instruments has been entrenched ever since courts have found the provisions of the
Universal Declaration to be non-binding.”).
75. See Martin A. Rogoff & Barbara E. Gauditz, The Provisional Application of
International Agreements, 39 ME. L. REV. 29, 33-34 (1987).
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Each treaty has a corresponding “treaty body”—a body responsible for
the enforcement and monitoring of that treaty.76 The term enforcement is
used loosely here, as no human rights treaty body has military authority to
ensure treaty obligations are carried out.77 Instead, treaty bodies rely on
international pressure to encourage implementation of, and compliance
with, international norms found in human rights treaties.78 As a “party”,
ratifying states must submit reports to the treaty body on their compliance
with each ratified treaty.79
The treaty body may then issue
recommendations to the state party on how to maintain or achieve
compliance.80 Additionally, states are allowed to sign treaties “with
reservations,” i.e., the state signs the treaty but indicates its own
interpretation of certain articles or text in the treaty itself.81 Then, if the
treaty body cites the state for a violation of the treaty,82 the state may
attempt to point to its reservation as a defense.83
Some treaty bodies are also judicial. These bodies will hear cases, find
violations of the treaty, and issue specific recommendations and suggested
remedies.84 In some configurations, the treaty body itself hears a case.85 In
other configurations, the treaty body may serve as a commission and decide
76. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN
RIGHTS
TREATY
SYSTEM
23
(2012),
available
at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/docs/OHCHR-FactSheet30.pdf
[hereinafter
HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM].
77. See Terry Collingsworth, The Key Human Rights Challenge: Developing
Enforcement Mechanisms, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 183, 183-84 (2002) (noting that
Burma is a perfect example of this, as its human rights abuses have been reported and
pronounced numerous times, yet the abuse has not stopped).
78. See id. (“Any hopes for a remedy to human rights violations are generally left
to the sometimes-influential but ultimately unenforceable mechanisms of moral
persuasion and damning reports.”).
79. Human RIGHTS TREATY SYSTEM, supra note 75, at 24.
80. Id. at 31.
81. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 2(1)(d), May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331.
82. See DONNELLY, supra note 71, at 5.
83. What kind of reservations may be enforced, and the enforceability of
reservations in general, is debatable. See Ryan Goodman, Human Rights Treaties,
Invalid Reservations, and State Consent, 96 AM. J. INT. L. 531, 531-32 (2002).
84. See generally Human Rights Bodies: Complaint Procedures, OFF. OF THE HIGH
COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS., http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.htm
(last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
85. See, e.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 12, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CRC].
(instructing States parties to hear cases under the Convention on the Right to the
Child) [hereinafter Convention on the Rights of the Child].
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which cases to pass to a court connected with a treaty or charter.86 In still a
third configuration, the court is the only body connected with the treaty,
and thus serves as both commission and court.87 However it happens,
states are expected to follow the recommendations of the treaty body or
face international pressure and embarrassment.88 Therefore, international
human rights “law” is law in a social sense.89 There are no sanctions or
fines, and the only punishments are shame and perhaps weak retaliation
carried out by single countries or small groups of nations.90
Some human rights bodies govern specific geographic regions, such as
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the African Commission
for Human and People’s Rights.
These regional bodies, though
independent of the UN, have similar systems to the one described above,
and many use and have used the UN treaties and processes as a basis for
their work and interpretation of human rights.91
Though sometimes criticized as ineffective,92 the influence of human
rights law on the way the world conceptualizes “inviolable rights” is

86. See, e.g., Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights, INTER-AMERICAN
COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., http://www.cidh.org/basicos/english/Basic1.%20Intro.htm
(last visited Apr. 21, 2014) (indicating that the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights decides admissibility of cases to the Inter-American Court of Human Rights).
87. See, e.g., Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221. Otherwise known as the European
Convention on Human Rights, it is the sole interpreter of the European Convention on
Human Rights. Id. at 246.
88. Cf. Douglas Donoho, Human Rights Enforcement in the Twenty-First Century,
35 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 5 (2006) (“Both Pollyannaish and cynical, the
international system heavily relies upon the dubious premise that governments will
faithfully implement international human rights standards within their own domestic
systems and provide adequate domestic remedies to redress violations . . . Although not
without exceptions, most international human rights institutions are generally limited to
monitoring state compliance and promoting adherence to underdeveloped international
standards through dialogue, condemnation, and moral suasion.”).
89. Cf. id.
90. See id.
91. See Fekadeselassie F. Kidanemariam, Enforcement of Human Rights Under
Regional Mechanisms: A Comparative Analysis, 5-6 (Jan. 1, 2006) (unpublished
L.L.M. thesis, University of Georgia School of Law), available at
http://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1079&context=stu_llm.
92. Largely, criticism of human rights law is about a lack of enforceability. See,
e.g., Penelope E. Andrews, Some Middle-Age Spread, A Few Mood Swings, and
Growing Exhaustion: The Human Rights Movement at Middle Age, 41 TULSA L. REV.
693, 700 (2006) (citing Wojciech Sadurski, Postcommunist Charters of Rights in
Europe and the U.S. Bill of Rights, 65 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 223, 230 (2002)).
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paramount.93 Though these laws may not always offer protection, they
offer recognition,94 and this is a great step forward to enforcement.95
Although some scholars characterize them as merely aspirational,96 UN
treaties represent the legal floor for standards in international law. 97 Since
most human rights bodies are based in large part upon these treaties, the
next section will examine potentially implicated rights under a selected set
of UN treaties. This Article will then examine the state of the law as
interpreted by both UN treaty bodies and regional charters and treaty
bodies.
B. Potentially Implicated Rights
To consider which rights are implicated in embryonic personhood, it is
first important to consider individual treaties and resolutions, followed by
how the treaty bodies have interpreted the rights set forth in these treaties.
This section identifies and analyzes several rights that have either proven to
be, or may prove to be, implicated when considering personhood from a
human rights perspective.
The original conception of modern-day human rights was set out in the
93. See Jerome J. Shestack, The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights, 20
HUM. RTS. Q. 201, 233 (1998) (concluding that “human rights have become hegemonic
and therefore universal by fiat”).
94. In some cases, not all minorities are explicitly recognized in human rights
documents. There are large rifts in the human rights field as to whether protections for
these minorities can be found in existing treaty articles or if new treaties should be
drafted for each group in need of protection. See Frédéric Mégret, The Disabilities
Convention: Human Rights of Persons with Disabilities or Disability Rights?, 30
HUM. RTS. Q. 494, 505 (2008).
95. Cf. Randall S. Abate, Climate Change, the United States, and the Impacts of
Arctic Melting: A Case Study in the Need for Enforceable International Environmental
Human Rights, 26 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 10 (2007) (discussing how the recognition of
environmental rights as human rights may lead to greater enforcement). Though
environmentalism is a very different topic from IVF, the idea of recognition as helpful
to enforcement bleeds across into all areas of human rights.
96. See Eric Engle, Universal Human Rights: A Generational History, 12 ANN.
SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 219, 226 (2006).
97. Cf. World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, Vienna
Declaration and Programme of Action, ¶ I.1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (July 12,
1993).
(“The World Conference on Human Rights reaffirms the solemn commitment of all
States to fulfil [sic] their obligations to promote universal respect for, and observance
and protection of, all human rights and fundamental freedoms for all in accordance
with the Charter of the United Nations, other instruments relating to human rights, and
international law. The universal nature of these rights and freedoms is beyond
question.”).
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in December of 1948.98
The UDHR itself is not a treaty, but rather a resolution.99 However, on the
heels of the UDHR many new international treaties and treaty bodies
formed within the United Nations, and three regional human rights systems
emerged: the Inter-American System (including a Commission and a
Court),100 the African System,101 and the European System.102
There are nine major international human rights treaties and one major
resolution.103 Among these, there are a few that are particularly pertinent to
personhood: The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),104 the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR),105 the Convention on the
Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW),106
and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).107
This article focuses on these particular instruments because of their
overarching influence (UDHR),108 pertinence to the parties involved (CRC
and CEDAW)109 and importance to traditional legal arguments about
98. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, supra note 70.
99. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 19. Technically, the

UDHR is not a treaty, but rather it is a resolution by the United Nations General
Assembly. However, scholars argue that it has become a binding force in international
law. See DONNELLY, supra note 70, at 8. Together with the International Covenant on
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, it comprises the International Bill of Human Rights. Id.
100. The Inter-American System includes a Commission on Human Rights and a
Court of Human Rights. See What is the IACHR?, ORG. OF AM. STATES,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/what.asp (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
101. The African System includes both the African Commission on Human and
People’s Rights and the African Court on Human and People’s Rights.
102. The European System once included both a Commission and a Court, but the
Commission has since been dissolved. See Council of Europe: European Commission
on
Human
Rights,
REFWORLD
(Feb.
28,
2014,
1:24
PM),
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/publisher/COECOMMHR.html.
103. See International Human Rights Law, OFF. OF THE HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM.
RTS., http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
104. CRC, supra note 85, at 167.
105. UDHR, supra note 19.
106. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW].
107. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171[hereinafter ICCPR].
108. See GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE FOR
GLOBAL JUSTICE 45 (4th ed. 2012) (noting the continuing influence of the UDHR on
modern constitutional and legislative documents).
109. The CRC is about the rights of the child, and CEDAW is about the rights of
women. These are the two parties whose rights would be most involved if personhood
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reproductive rights (ICCPR).110 Using these human rights instruments as a
guide, this Article analyzes the potentially implicated rights if embryos are
granted personhood.
1. The Right to Life
The right to life is set forth as the basis for all other fundamental
rights.111 Although the original scholarly interpretation of the right to life
was related to arbitrary deprivation of life in war and violence, human
rights advocates now understand it to mean that States should take
measures to prevent unnecessary death.112 Without this right, other rights
However, when exactly life begins remains
would not exist.113
controversial. Those that argue life, in all understandings, begins at
conception would insist that the right to life starts once an egg is
fertilized.114 Others argue that although conception may be the biological
were recognized in the legal arena, and thus these two treaties are of great importance
in the personhood debate.
110. Many arguments in other areas of the reproductive rights arena rely on civil
and political rights as a backbone, such as privacy and bodily integrity. See, e.g., Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (explaining that the “right of privacy . . . is broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy”);
Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 10, 2006, Sentencia C355/06,
§
II
(1)
(Colom.),
available
at
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2006/C-355-06.htm
(author’s
translation) (noting that the decision to have a child falls within the privacy sphere); R.
v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.R. 30, 32-33 (Can.) (noting that the criminalization of
abortion interferes with a woman’s bodily integrity and security of person); K.L. v.
Peru, Judgment U.N. Human Rights Comm., No. 1153/2003, ¶ 6.4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003
(2005),
available
at
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/KL%20HRC%2
0final%20decision.pdf (noting that Peru’s failure to allow K.L. to have an abortion was
a privacy violation).
111. Right to Life: Understanding Children’s Right to Life, HUMANIUM,
http://www.humanium.org/en/fundamental-rights/life/ (last visited Apr. 21,2014)
[hereinafter Right to Life]. This right is featured in the following treaties: Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 19; International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, supra note 106, at art. 6; Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra
note 84, at 167.
112. Janine Kossen, Rights, Respect, Responsibility: Advancing the Sexual and
Reproductive Health and Rights of Young People Through International Human Rights
Law, 15 U. PA. J. L. & SOC. CHANGE 143, 157 (2012).
113. Right to Life, supra note 110.
114. See, e.g., Steven Ertelt, Scientific Fact: Human Life Begins at Conception, or
Fertilization,
LIFENEWS
(Nov.
18,
2013,
7:08
PM),
http://www.lifenews.com/2013/11/18/undisputed-scientific-fact-human-life-begins-atconception-or-fertilization/.
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beginning of life, the social meaning of life begins later.115 “Later” is
defined in various ways—some define it at eight weeks,116 some at 16-18
weeks,117 some at viability,118 and others not until a child exits the womb.119
Depending on a court’s idea of when conception begins, it could either use
the right to life to uphold or to strike down personhood laws. However, an
analysis of pertinent human rights treaties demonstrates that the right to life
was not meant to apply to embryos.
a. Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 1 of the UDHR begins by stating that, “all human beings are born
free and equal in dignity and rights.”120 At its adoption, the UN
representative from France explained that this statement was intended to
protect rights “from the moment of birth.”121 Since Article 1 prefaces the
entire document, it seems clear that all subsequent rights are meant to apply
to persons already born, not to fetuses or embryos.122
b. Convention on the Rights of the Child
Similarly, the CRC defines a child as “every human being below the age
115. See JOHN HARRIS, ENHANCING EVOLUTION: THE ETHICAL CASE FOR MAKING
BETTER PEOPLE 97 (2010) (“[P]ersons properly so-called are individuals capable of
valuing their own existence.”); see also Michael V.L. Bennett, Personhood From a
Neuroscientific Perspective, in ABORTION RIGHTS AND FETAL ‘PERSONHOOD’ (2d ed.
1990) (arguing that the brain is where personhood begins).
116. John M. Goldenring, The Brain-Life Theory: Towards a Consistent Biological
Definition of Humanness, 11 J. MED. ETHICS 198, 199 (1985) (advocating a “brain-life”
theory of when a fetus becomes a person under the law, saying that at eight weeks the
brain begins to function, thus rendering a mass of cells a “person”).
117. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 132 (1973) (noting that in English common law,
life was understood to begin at “quickening”, or somewhere around 16-18 weeks).
118. See id. at 159-60, 163 (finding though the Court was not in a position to say
when life began, they do state that “meaningful life” begins at viability, which is
commonly understood to be around 24-28 weeks); see also Kevin Glass, Democratic
Connecticut Senate Candidate: Life Begins at Birth, TOWNHALL (Oct. 19, 2012, 8:43
PM),
http://townhall.com/tipsheet/kevinglass/2012/10/19/democrat_connecticut_senate_cand
idate_life_begins_at_birth (noting that “[m]any more Americans believe that fetal life
begins at viability”).
119. See Glass,C:\Users\Downloads\s supra supra note 117 (relaying that a political
candidate announced his belief that life begins at birth).
120. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 19.
121. Rhonda Copelon et al., Human Rights Begin at Birth: International Law and
the Claim of Fetal Rights, 13 REPRO. HEALTH MATTERS 120, 122 (2005) [hereinafter
Copelon].
122. See id. at 121-22.
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of eighteen years.”123 While “human being” is not defined, the Committee
on the Rights of the Child, the CRC’s treaty body, has called upon states to
include safe abortion services in their provision of reproductive health to
adolescents,124 which would seem to indicate that embryos are not human
beings.125 The only provision that can be interpreted as potentially
clarifying the scope of the right is in the Preamble, which states that
children should receive legal protection “before as well as after birth.”126
This language was advanced by the Holy See,127 representatives for the seat
of the Catholic Hierarchy in the Vatican. However, the Holy See clarified
that this amendment “was not to preclude the possibility of an abortion.”128
Moreover, the amendment was added with the caveat that it was not
intended to “prejudice the interpretation of Article 1.”129 Clearly, the
drafters did not want the Preamble’s language to be interpreted as granting
rights to the unborn.130
c. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination
Against Women
CEDAW’s treaty language is highly sanitized in terms of reproductive
rights,131 and it never explicitly discusses the right to life.132 However,
when the CEDAW Committee issues reports, it frames access to safe
abortion as a right to life issue for pregnant women.133 Since it encourages
states to facilitate safe abortion due to maternal mortality rates, CEDAW
123. CRC, supra note 85, at art. 1.
124. Copelon et al., supra note 121, at 122-23.
125. If embryos were human beings, all other CRC rights would apply to them,

therefore precluding abortion. See id.
126. CRC, supra note 85, at Preamble ¶ 9.
127. Copelon et al., supra note 121, at 122.
128. Id. (citing Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 84, at art. 12).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. By this I mean that CEDAW as a treaty does not position its discussion of
abortion in the context of a woman’s right to choose. Rather, it discusses abortion in
the context of maternal health, thus making it more palatable to states that refuse to
recognize that abortion can be an autonomous option.
132. Copelon et al., supra note 121, at 123. There are provisions however that can
be read as in support of a woman’s right to choose, such as the right to decide on the
number and spacing of one’s children. See Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 105, at art. 16.
133. Copelon et al., supra note 121, at 123; see also CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS.,
BRINGING
RIGHTS
TO
BEAR
3
(2008),
available
at
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/BRB_abortion_h
r_revised_3.09_WEB.PDF.
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prioritizes the life of the mother over the “life” of the embryo or fetus.134
Thus, if it can be assumed that a treaty would not grant rights to an embryo,
take them away as a fetus and grant them again to a born child. Therefore,
CEDAW does not recognize embryonic personhood.
d. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
Many of the provisos of the ICCPR specify the importance of negative
duties, or protecting individuals from their governments.135 These negative
duties, however, are understood as existing in conjunction with a
government’s positive obligation to protect its own citizens.136 Therefore,
in the context of human rights norms, the right to life is dualistic. It is
presumed to be a principle violated by undue governmental intrusion where
the government is also expected to take positive steps to protect the right to
life.
Both the drafters and the current treaty body of the ICCPR have refused
to codify the existence of a prenatal right to life.137 The drafters of the
ICCPR explicitly rejected a proposal saying: “the right to life is inherent in
the human person from the moment of conception, [and] this right shall be
protected by law.”138 The Human Rights Committee (HRC), the ICCPR’s
treaty body, has since made numerous pronouncements in favor of
liberalizing abortion laws, noting that clandestine abortions are a risk to a
pregnant woman’s right to life.139
134. Copelon et al., supra note 121, at 123.
135. This is in contrast to social and economic rights, which are more about positive

duties, or minimum standards of needs the government must provide for its citizens.
See Eric A. Posner, Human Welfare, Not Human Rights, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1758,
1764-65 (2008).
136. Id. at 1765 (discussing the fact that the UDHR contains both positive and
negative rights, which shows that originally the international community understood
them to exist together, despite the bifurcation in the treaty system caused by the Cold
War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union).
137. See CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., RIGHTS AT RISK: THE TRUTH ABOUT PRENATAL
PERSONHOOD
15-16
(2012),
available
at
http://www.ushrnetwork.org/sites/default/files/crr_personhoodpapers_briefingpaper.pdf
.
138. Id. at 15 (quoting U.N. GAOR Annex, 12th Sess., Agenda item 33, at 96, U.N.
Doc. A/C.3/L.654 (1957); U.N. GAOR, 12th Sess., Agenda Item 33, at 113, U.N. Doc.
A/3764 (1957)).
139. Id. at 15 (citing United Nations, Human Rights Comm., General Comment No.
28, Article 3 (Equality of Rights Between Men and Women), ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.10 (Mar. 29, 2000); United Nations, Human Rights Comm.,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant, Concluding Observations: Colombia, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/COL/CO/6
(August 4, 2010); United Nations, Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports
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For example, the HRC decided its first abortion case in 2005, K.L. v.
Peru.140 In that case, the HRC ruled that Peru’s failure to allow an abortion
for a minor unduly interfered with her right to privacy under Article 17 of
the ICCPR.141
Moreover, the Committee members reiterated that
“restrictive provisions on abortion” subject women to “inhumane
treatment” and that criminalization of abortion is prohibited under Articles
3, 6 (the right to life), and 7 of the ICCPR.142 The state’s refusal to allow
an abortion left K.L. with two risky options: seeking a clandestine abortion
or carrying a dangerous pregnancy to term.143 In this case, the dualistic
right to life required Peru to stop interfering in K.L.’s ability to get an
abortion, and to thus protect her from the harm that either a clandestine
abortion or a dangerous pregnancy would bring.
The HRC’s
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding
Observations: El Salvador, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/SLV/CO/6 (November 18, 2010);
United Nations, Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations: Poland, ¶ 8, U.N.
Doc. CCPR/CO/82/POL (Dec. 2, 2004); United Nations, Human Rights Comm.,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant, Concluding Observations: Argentina, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/ARG/CO/4
(March 31, 2010); United Nations, Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding
Observations: Ireland, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/IRL/CO/3 (July 30, 2008); United
Nations, Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of this Covenant, Concluding Observations: Mexico, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/MEX/CO/5 (May 17, 2010); United Nations, Human Rights Comm.,
Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the
Covenant, Concluding Observations: Monaco, ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C?MCO/CO/2
(Dec. 12, 2008); United Nations, Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding
Observations: Nicaragua, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/NIC/CO/3 (Dec. 12, 2008); United
Nations, Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties
Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations: Panama, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/PAN/CO/3 (Apr. 17, 2008)).
140. K.L. v. Peru, Judgment U.N. Human Rights Comm., No. 1153/2003, U.N.
Doc.
CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003
(2005),
available
at
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/KL%20HRC%2
0final%20decision.pdf.
141. Among other violations. See id. at ¶ 6.4. In this case, the minor was carrying
an anencephalic fetus, which risks danger to the life of the mother and the fetus if
carried to term. Both the minor and the fetus had severe health complications, and the
child’s death four days after birth caused K.L. to go into a deep depression.
142. Id. at ¶ 3.5.
143. Id. at ¶ 3.3. In addition to a violation of privacy, the HRC ruled Peru’s actions
were a violation of the right to an effective remedy due to discriminatory treatment
based on sex, id. at ¶ 6.6, the right to protection of minors, id. at ¶ 6.5, and the right not
to be subjected to torture, cruel, or inhuman punishment. Id. at ¶ 6.3.
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acknowledgement that restrictive abortion provisions violate the right to
life further demonstrates that the ICCPR’s right to life provision is not
meant to apply to embryos.
2. The Right to Privacy
The right to privacy has been used in international law to both uphold
and restrict regulations related to embryonic personhood.144 The right to
privacy is defined as the right to be free from “arbitrary interference” by
the government.145 A typical caveat is that the government is justified in
some privacy interference when it is related to matters of public import,
such as national security, public health, or public morals.146
In jurisprudence concerning medical matters, the right to privacy is
sometimes cited to prevent arbitrary governmental interference with
choices about health. For example, in states that recognize health care as a
privacy right, a woman seeking an abortion cannot be arbitrarily denied
that abortion by the state, as this would be an interference with her private
health care choices.147 By the same logic, denying a couple or single
person the right to freeze leftover eggs would also be an interference with
private healthcare choices.148 Moreover, since infertility can and has been
conceptualized as a health problem,149 a doctor’s recommendation
144. See id. at ¶ 6.4; see also, Evans v. United Kingdom., 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21, ¶ 6970 (2006).
145. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 19, at art. 12.
146. See Robert A. Ermanski, The Right to Privacy for Gay People Under
International Human Rights Law, 15 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 141, 148 (1992)
(noting that the right to privacy is subject to lawful limitations); see, e.g., USA Patriot
Act § 201, 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2012) (allowing a certain level of invasion of privacy
under the justification of national security); Rebecca F. Wisch, Table of State Animal
Sexual
Assault
Laws,
ANIMAL
LEGAL
&
HIST.
SOC’Y,
http://www.animallaw.info/articles/State%20Tables/tbusanimalassault.htm (last visited
Apr. 21, 2014) (explaining that bestiality laws are largely justified under judicial
conceptions of public morality).
147. As this could also be characterized as government interference with a private
choice about fertility, a health-related matter. See supra Part III(A)(4) (discussing K.L.
v. Peru).
148. See Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman: Availability and
Culpability in Reproductive Health Jurisprudence, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 97, 98 (2010)
(“[T]he ability to control one’s fertility is a health issue.”).
149. See Françoise Shenfield et al., European Society of Human Reproduction and
Embryology Task Force on Ethics and Law, Gamete and Embryo Donation, 17 HUM.
REPROD. 1407, 1407 (2002). The World Health Organization has similarly classified
infertility as a disease and a disability. See Infertility Definition and Terminology,
WORLD
HEALTH
ORG.,
http://www.who.int/reproductivehealth/topics/infertility/definitions/en/index.html (last
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regarding infertility treatments, including IVF and egg-freezing, should be
treated similarly to other health problems. That is, the patient’s choice
should be respected as a decision protected under the right to privacy.150
The question of how human rights bodies have treated the right to
privacy is a difficult one to answer.151 Although the right to privacy is
found in several human rights documents,152 its scope is unclear. The right
to privacy, perhaps more so than other rights, has been applied in a wide
variety of situations.153 Human rights scholar James Griffin identifies three
conceptions of this right: privacy of information, privacy of space and life,
and privacy of liberty.154 Within these spheres, there are also further
divisions.155 Therefore, conceptually, the right to privacy can apply in
many areas of life and law. However, since there is little guidance to be
found in the treaties – and the cases are varied – the best way to currently
assess the scope of privacy law is to examine specific cases that can be
used as models for how the right to privacy could apply to embryonic
personhood.
Specifically, many cases that address reproductive rights in general use
the privacy right as all or part of the legal argument in favor of access to
those rights. For example, in K.L. v. Peru,156 Roe v. Wade,157 and C-355/
06,158 the privacy right is used to justify the right to access an abortion. In

visited Apr. 21, 2014). It is unclear, as of yet, if social or elective infertility will be
included in this definition, which is largely medical in nature.
150. See Evans v. United Kingdom, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21, ¶ 71 (2006).
151. See Ermanski, supra note 145, at 148.
152. See INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, SEXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER IDENTITY AND
INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN
RIGHTS
LAW
47
(2009),
available
at
http://www.icj.org/dwn/database/PractitionersGuideonSOGI.pdf [hereinafter INT’L
COMM’N OF JURISTS].
153. INT’L COMM’N OF JURISTS, supra note 151, at 48-49.
154. JAMES GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS 234 (2008).
155. Id. at 234.
156. K.L. v. Peru, Human Rights Comm., No. 1153/2003, ¶ 6.4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003
(2005)
available
at
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/KL%20HRC%2
0final%20decision.pdf (noting that Peru’s failure to allow K.L. to have an abortion was
a privacy violation).
157. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“This right of privacy. . .is broad
enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.”).
158. Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 10, 2006, Sentencia
C-355/06,
§
II
(1)
(Colom.),
available
at
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2006/C-355-06.htm
(author’s
translation) (last visited Apr. 20, 2014) (noting that the decision to have a child falls
within the privacy sphere).
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Evans v. U.K., the court concludes that a law on parental consent to the
destruction of embryos does not violate the privacy right, affirming the
balancing of competing societal and private interests.159 In Artavia Murillo
y otros (“Fecundación in vitro”) vs. Costa Rica, the court declares a ban on
IVF to be a privacy violation in part due to the fact that a ban does not
allow couples to have autonomy in their personal decisions concerning
childbearing.160 Artavia Murillo and Evans have other implications as well,
and are discussed in full below.161 Thus, the privacy right has largely been
interpreted to support situations that are at odds with embryonic
personhood, such as IVF and abortion. As such, embryonic personhood is
not a concept recognized under the right to privacy.
3. The Right to Found a Family
Both the UDHR and the ICCPR contain the “right to marry and found a
family.”162 The right to found a family is not explicitly clarified in human
rights law. However, as the IACHR recently used this right to declare the
Costa Rican ban on IVF a violation of human rights in Artavia Murillo, its
relevance for embryonic personhood is clear.163
Some commentators argue that the right to found a family is
encompassed in a general “right to procreate,” which is tied to the broader
body of reproductive rights.164 However, there is a split regarding the
right’s breadth. Some see it as an unfettered general right to make all
related childbearing decisions.165 This is based in part on the sweeping
159. See Evans v. United Kingdom, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21, ¶ 92 (2006); see also
Richard F. Storrow, The Proportionality Problem in Cross-Border Reproductive Care,
in THE GLOBALIZATION OF HEALTH CARE 125, 125-47 (I. Glenn Cohen ed., 2013)
(noting the breadth of appreciation argument).
160. Artavia Murillo (“Fecundación in Vitro”) v. Costa Rica, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, ¶¶ 281, 285, 317 (Nov. 28, 2012). The court also says that
the right to privacy is violated when governments place obstacles around the ways a
woman chooses to control her fertility, including the decision to become a genetic
parent. See id. at ¶ 39. Further, the court notes that, in the IVF context, the rights to
private life and reproductive freedom become the right to access the medical
technology needed to exercise those rights, and therefore the reach of the privacy right,
reproductive autonomy, and the right to found a family extend to the right to benefit
from the progress of science and the right to access reproductive technologies, like
IVF. See id. at ¶ 31.
161. See infra § IV(A) & (B)(1).
162. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 19, at art. 16; International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 106, at art. 23(2).
163. See Artavia Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 at ¶ 150, 317; see
also infra Part IV(B) (discussing the implications of the case).
164. See Dillard, supra note 31, at 27-28.
165. Reed Boland, Civil and Political Rights and the Right to Nondiscrimination:
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generalization of the right in some documents, and in part on human rights
law’s broad deference to individuals, rather than states, in matters such as
abortion.166
For instance, CEDAW states that men and women have equal “rights to
decide freely and responsibly the number and spacing of their children, and
to have access to the information, education, and means to enable them to
exercise these rights.”167 The interpretation of any right as unfettered is, of
course, unrealistic, considering that all rights are subject to limitations by
other rights. However, embryonic personhood implicates the right to found
a family because it could preclude infertile couples, single individuals, or
same-sex couples from pursuing fertility treatments,168 which would limit
their right to become biological parents. According to the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, the right to become biological parents is
inherent in the right to found a family.169
4. The Right to Non-Discrimination
Finally, in a creative application of human rights law, the right to nondiscrimination potentially protects the legality of IVF. If a state denies a
right, such as the right to found a family, based on a couple or single
person’s infertility170 or same-sex status,171 for instance, it may be violating
Population Policies, Human Rights, and Legal Change, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1257, 1263
(1995) (arguing that the ICCPR “implies the right to make fully voluntary decisions
about childbearing”).
166. See generally Human Rights: Supporting the Constellation of Reproductive
Rights, U. N. POPULATION FUND, http://www.unfpa.org/rights/rights.htm (last visited
Apr. 21, 2014).
167. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, supra note 105.
168. See supra Part II for a discussion of how personhood could affect IVF, thereby
affecting those who need access to IVF in order to become genetic or gestational
parents. See also Artavia Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. No. 12.361 at ¶¶ 85-125
(detailing the heartache of infertile couples caused by infertility coupled with a ban on
IVF treatments).
169. See Martin Hevia & Carlos Herrera Vacaflor, The Legal Status of In Vitro
Fertilization in Latin America and the American Convention on Human Rights, 36
SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 51, 71 (2013) (quoting Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica,
Case 12.361, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 85/10, ¶ 80 (2010), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/demandas/12.361Eng.pdf).
170. See Artavia Murillo (“Fecundación in Vitro”) v. Costa Rica, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, ¶ 126 (Nov. 28, 2012). Representative Molina of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is quoted in the decision as saying that
infertility qualifies as a disability, and that the infertile couples in this case were
discriminated against for their infertility-disability. Id. The Court does not affirm this
statement, but merely acknowledges that it was made. Id.
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the non-discrimination principle. The right to non-discrimination includes
some enumerated categories (e.g., race, color, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin) as well as the category
of “other status,” which can and has been used by human rights bodies to
protect all manner of statuses.172 However, the UN is clear that this right
does not prohibit all distinctions.173 Rather, the prohibition is on
unreasonable, non-legitimate distinctions.174 For example, distinctions that
are made to remedy discrimination are permissible, whereas distinctions
that prohibit people from enjoying their rights “on equal footing” with
others are impermissible.175 If this right were to be invoked in the face of
embryonic personhood classifications, the questions for human rights
bodies would be: 1) whether fertility is a legitimate distinction for
discrimination purposes,176 2) whether a ban on IVF discriminates against
171. This is similar to an argument made by the Malta Gay Rights Movement in
response to the Embryo Protection Act, a law made by the Maltese government that
excludes same-sex couples and singles from a definition of “prospective parent”.
Though the Malta Gay Rights Movements objected on the grounds of the human right
to found a family, this means that lack of access to IVF could be seen as discriminatory
against those who – like same-sex couples – may need IVF technology in order to
realize the right to found a family. See Embryo Protection Act (2013) Cap. 524, (2013)
Cap.,
available
at
http://justiceservices.gov.mt/DownloadDocument.aspx?app=lom&itemid=11960&l=1;
see also Matthew Xuereb, Bishop: IVF Law Is ‘Not Homophobic,’ TIMES OF MALTA
(Sept.
17,
2013
12:01AM),
http://www.timesofmalta.com/articles/view/20130917/local/Bishop-IVF-law-is-nothomophobic-.486481#.UtAcf2RDvVs. It is unclear as to whether the right could be
extended to single people or those pursuing elective fertility, depending on whether
these pursuits can be classified under non-discrimination theory.
172. See Sophie M. Clavier, Objection Overruled: The Binding Nature of the
International Norm Prohibiting Discrimination Against Homosexual and
Transgendered Individuals, 35 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 385, 390-93 (2012).
173. OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISS’R FOR HUM. RTS., The Right to Equality and NonDiscrimination in the Administration of Justice, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES, PROSECUTORS AND LAWYERS
651
(2003),
available
at
http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/training9chapter13en.pdf.
174. Id.
175. See id. at 660.
176. This question has been invoked before the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights in the Artavia Murillo case, but the discrimination was premised on the
basis that infertility is a disability, and thus that a ban on IVF was discriminatory
against people with infertility-disabilities. The discrimination issue was not addressed
by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ (binding) follow-up decision. See
Artavia Murillo (“Fecundación in Vitro”) v. Costa Rica, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.
(ser. C) No. 257, ¶ 138 (Nov. 28, 2012). (quoting in dicta Representative Molina of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights as saying that infertility qualifies as a
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same-sex couples,177 and 3) whether that discrimination extends to other
social or elective forms of fertility – and the limitations therein.178
5. Reproductive Rights
Although they are not made explicit in any human rights treaty, the
appellation “reproductive rights” is used as an umbrella term to capture a
variety of experiences people have related to reproduction, including, but
not limited to, contraception, access to safe abortion, and freedom from
forced abortions.179 In the absence of an explicit pronouncement declaring
IVF to be encompassed under an existing human right, it can and should be
included where treaty bodies issue reports and makes recommendations on
“reproductive rights.” By recognizing IVF under this umbrella term, states
would be discouraged from banning or over-regulating the procedure under
international human rights law.180
IV. STATE OF THE LAW
The majority of cases analyzed below concern fetal personhood, as most
human rights bodies have not explicitly addressed embryonic
personhood.181 However, operating under the assumption that a court’s
rejection of fetal personhood reasonably implies that it would also reject
disability, and that the infertile couples in this case were discriminated against for their
infertility-disability).
177. Because same-sex couples use IVF in order to become genetic parents to a
child, this is one ground on which discrimination could be invoked, saying that a ban
on IVF is discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or “other status.”
178. I assume courts would articulate limitations surrounding, at least, elective
forms of fertility where the denial of IVF or resources to access the same is based on a
wish to delay parenthood that is unconnected to a medical condition. It is much harder
to articulate a theory of discrimination when one uses IVF only because one is not
ready to parent until a later age, though there may be case-by-case exceptions. There
are also compelling arguments to the contrary. See, e.g., Imogen Goold & Julian
Savulescu, In Favour of Freezing Eggs for Non-Medical Reasons, 23 BIOETHICS 47,
47-58 (2009).
179. See generally Human Rights: Supporting the Constellation of Reproductive
Rights, supra note 165.
180. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights, for example, has ruled that IVF
relates specifically to reproductive rights, and that the right to found a family includes
the right to access the necessary reproductive technologies (like IVF) to do so. See,
e.g., Artavia Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 ¶¶ 144, 150. Hopefully this
would also encourage some modicum of regulation, since although over-regulation can
be tantamount to deprivation in some cases, some regulation is important to ensure
safety and ethical medical practices.
181. There are currently no overarching Asian human rights bodies, nor are there
human rights bodies in Oceania, so the analysis here is limited to existing bodies.
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embryonic personhood; this section will attempt to synthesize the state of
international law around the rights of embryos.
A. Europe and the European Court of Human Rights
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) 182 has implicitly denied
fetal personhood on four occasions. In Paton v. U.K., the Court ruled that
the word “everyone” in Article 2 of the European Convention (the
governing document of the Court183) does not include fetuses.184 In both
R.H. v. Norway and Boso v. Italy, the Court held that a fetal right to life did
not outweigh the interests of the pregnant woman, again affirming that the
use of the word “everyone” in Article 2 does not include fetuses.185 In Vo
v. France, the Court again declined to rule explicitly that Article 2 includes
fetuses, but was also particularly evasive regarding whether Article 2 could
potentially be interpreted that way.186
Most conclusive on the issue of embryonic personhood is the more
recent case of Evans v. U.K.187 In Evans, a couple wanted to use IVF to
have a child.188 The couple separated before IVF treatments began, but
after the embryos had been fertilized.189 After the separation, the husband
wrote to the clinic where the embryos were stored, asking for them to be
destroyed, thereby effectively withdrawing his consent for their continued
storage.190 Under English law, the consent of both potential parents is
required for continued storage of embryos.191 Thus, the wife sued to
182. The European Court of Human Rights is now the main adjudicatory body in
the European Human Rights System. Previously, there was also a European
Commission on Human Rights, which disbanded in 1998. The Commission mainly
served a gatekeeping function for the Court. See Storrow, supra note 158, at 133
(citing MICHAEL D. GOLDHABER, A PEOPLE’S HISTORY OF THE COURT OF HUMAN
RIGHTS 4 (2007)).
183. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, 2000 O.J. (C 364) 1.
184. Paton v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8416/78, 3 Eur. H.R. Rep. 408, 413
(1981).
185. RH v. Norway, App. No. 17004/90, 73 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 155
(1992); Boso v. Italy, 2002-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 441, available at
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?action=html&documentId=671625&portal=
hbkm&source=externalbydocnumber&table=F69A27FD8FB86142BF01C1166DEA39
8649.
186. See Tanya Goldman, Vo. v. France and Human Rights: The Decision Not to
Decide, 18 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 277, 278-79 (2005).
187. Evans v. United Kingdom, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. 21 (2006).
188. Id. at ¶¶ 13-15.
189. Id. at ¶¶ 17-18.
190. Id. at ¶ 18.
191. Id. at ¶ 15.
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restore her husband’s consent to the storage.192 After failing to win support
under English law, the wife sued in the ECHR, arguing that the English law
violated three articles of the European Convention.193 The wife argued that
the English law violated the embryo’s right to life under Article 2, her right
to respect for private and family life under Article 8, and her right to nondiscrimination under Article 14.194 The ECHR ruled in favor of the
husband on all counts.195
As for the embryo’s right to life, the Court ruled that “the issue of when
the right to life begins comes within the margin of appreciation. . .under
English law. . .[and] an embryo does not have independent rights or
interests and cannot claim. . .a right to life under Article 2.”196 Therefore,
the ECHR has pronounced that the embryo lacks personhood under English
law, but that the margin of appreciation197 allows for other member states to
decide differently.
Moreover, the ECHR concluded that it is not a violation of privacy, or a
discriminatory measure, to require dual spousal consent for embryonic
storage.198 This measure is justified by balancing respect for the wife’s
desire to become a parent with the husband’s desire not to become a parent
such that one does not outweigh the other.199 This ruling was made in the
context of the Court’s broad deference to the United Kingdom due to the
lack of consensus among member states of the ECHR on the embryonic
storage consent issue.200 The Court further justified this ruling by noting
that it felt the United Kingdom was balancing the competing societal
interests (in medical consent) with private interests.201 This interpretation
of what Evans means for embryonic personhood was arguably affirmed by

192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Id. at ¶ 19.
Id. at ¶ 3.
Id.
Id. at ¶¶ 56, 92, 96.
Id. at ¶ 54.
The “margin of appreciation” is a concept in the ECHR whereby the Court
gives latitude to member states on certain issues that are not universally held in the
European system based on national interests or moral relativism. See Eyal Benvenisti,
Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. &
POL. 843, 843 (1999). This system threatens to undermine the universality of human
rights jurisprudence as a whole. Id. at 844.
198. Evans v. United Kingdom, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶¶ 68-70 (2006).
199. Natasha Hammond, Case Commentary: Evans v. The United Kingdom, in
ETHICS, LAW AND SOCIETY 363, 364-65 (Jennifer Gunning & Søren Holm ed., 2013).
200. Id. at 364.
201. See Evans, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 82; see also Storrow, supra note 64, at 298-99
(noting the breadth of appreciation argument).
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implication in the cases of S.H. v. Austria202 and Costa and Pavan vs.
Italy.203 Both of these cases concerned the regulation of IVF, and the fact
that neither case included a discussion of embryonic rights or embryonic
life, supports the conclusion that embryos are not legal persons.204
In sum, embryonic personhood is not recognized under human rights law
in the ECHR. However, this does not preclude other challenges that may
affect access to IVF, such as challenges over how IVF is regulated. This is
particularly true if challengers use Evans as precedent to successfully argue
that larger societal interests, such as public health or welfare, are at stake in
the use of procedures such as IVF.205
B. American States and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights
The Inter-American Human Rights System is arguably more complicated
than other governing human rights bodies. The main adjudicatory and
quasi-adjudicatory bodies are the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (collectively
IACHR).206 The IACHR is governed by two documents: the American
Convention on Human Rights (AC) and the American Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of Man (Declaration).207 The AC is the most up-to-date
human rights treaty in effect for the Organization of American States, the
oldest regional organization in the world.208 Some countries—like the

202. S.H. v. Austria, Judgment, App. No. 57813/00, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS. (Mar. 11,
2011), http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=002-309.
203. Costa v. Italy, App. No. 54270/10, EUR. CT. HUM. RTS. Eur. (Aug. 28, 2012),
http://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001-112993.
204. See Artavia Murillo (“Fecundación in Vitro”) v. Costa Rica, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, ¶ 242 (Nov. 28, 2012). It is also possible that the Court
did not want to reach this issue, and that is why they ignored it. But I think this
unlikely given the moral status that embryonic personhood proponents often attach to
embryos. If a majority of members of the Court felt that embryos were persons under
the law, embryonic life and/or rights would have been at least touched upon.
205. This has already happened, in fact, although personhood did not come up. See,
e.g., Costa, App. No. 54270/10 Eur. Ct. H.R. at ¶ 38-40; S.H., App. No. 57813/00, Eur.
Ct. H.R.
206. See Ligia M. De Jesus, Revisiting Baby Boy v. United States: Why the IACHR
Resolution Did Not Effectively Undermine the Inter-American System on Human
Rights’ Protection of the Right to Life from Conception, 23 FLA. J. INT’L L. 221, 224-25
(2011).
207. See
Sources
of
the
Mandate,
ORG.
OF
AM.
STATES,
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/mandate/sources.asp (last visited Apr. 21, 2014). Much of
the Declaration’s text is also included in the AC. Id.
208. See
Who
We
Are,
ORG.
OF
AM.
STATES,
http://www.oas.org/en/about/who_we_are.asp (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
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United States—are members of the Organization for American States, but
have not yet ratified the AC.209 Therefore, the default governing document
binding on the United States is the Declaration.210 Though the IACHR uses
the AC as the main legally governing document, the Declaration is still
considered binding on all member states.211
Therefore, when a potentially viable fetus was aborted in Massachusetts
but courts refused to charge the doctor with manslaughter; two pro-life
activists used the Declaration as a basis to bring the case of Baby Boy v.
United States212 before the Inter-American Commission.213 The petitioners
argued that Article 4(1) of the Declaration, protecting the right to life “in
general” applied here, under the premise that the United States’ refusal to
prosecute the doctor was a violation of their binding commitment to uphold
the Declaration. The United States, and ultimately the Inter-American
Commission, argued that a combination of current state practice and
historical drafting notes meant the words “in general” were intended to
allow states to permit abortion.214
This interpretation is arguably incorrect.215 As both advocates and critics
of the ruling note: it is not exactly clear why the Inter-American
Commission elected to decide the case in this manner.216 However, there
209. See De Jesus, supra note 206, at 231.
210. This is the oldest human rights treaty in existence, ratified just one year before

the UDHR, together with the Organization of American States’ Charter. See Elizabeth
Strenio, The Inter-American Human Rights System, HUM. RTS. EDUC. ASSOC.,
http://www.hrea.org/index.php?doc_id=413 (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
211. See Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man Within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human
Rights, Advisory Opinion OC-10/89, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A), No. 10, ¶ 12 (July 14,
1989), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/b_11_4j.htm; Basic
Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, INTER-AM.
COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic1.%20Intro.htm
(last visited Apr. 21, 2014). The United States contests the assertion that the
Declaration is binding law.
212. Baby Boy v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No.
23/81, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.54, doc. 9 rev. 1 ¶ 1-2 (1981), available at
http:/www.cidh.org/annualrep/80.81eng/USA2141.htm.
213. See De Jesus, supra note 206, at 226-27.
214. Id. at 233.
215. Id. at 258-262.
216. Id. at 263 (quoting Dinah Shelton, International Law on Protection of the
Fetus, in ABORTION AND PROTECTION OF THE HUMAN FETUS: LEGAL PROBLEMS IN A
CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 1, 4 (Stanislaw J. Frankowski & George F. Cole eds.,
1987) (noting the critiques that the Commission used “questionable reasoning, faulty
analysis, and little or no attention [was] paid to the usual canons of construction of
international documents”).
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are a fair number of countries in the Americas that continue to ban abortion
Some countries in the Americas
outright, with no exceptions.217
outspokenly interpret Article 4(1) of the convention to apply to life “from
conception,”218 which indicates their belief that fertilized embryos are
covered under Article 4(1).219 As noted earlier, the codification of the
notion that life begins at conception would make the embryo a legal person,
which is likely in direct conflict with the UDHR. Although the UDHR
does not govern the IACHR system specifically, it has persuasive authority
and relevancy to all human rights bodies as it is conceptualized as an
overarching human rights standard.220
However, in November 2012, the IACHR reaffirmed Baby Boy’s holding
in the Artavia Murillo case.221 In the decision, the Court conducts a
thorough analysis of the right to life and finds there is no precedent for
embryonic personhood in either the Inter-American System or the
International Human Rights system.222 The Court further undertakes a
comparative law analysis to the same end: the broad practice of IVF
implies that other countries have interpreted governing human rights
treaties as permissive of IVF and thus as contrary to the recognition of

217. See World Abortion Laws Map, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS.,
http://worldabortionlaws.com/map/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2014) (including El Salvador,
Honduras, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Suriname and Chile).
218. See De Jesus, supra note 206, at 265-66. De Jesus argues that a historical
analysis of the travaux préparatoires and various committees on interpretation of the
Declaration, along with the ordinary meaning “in light of its object and purpose” shows
that Article 4(1) is meant to protect both the “human embryo and human fetus’ right to
life from abortion, from the time of fertilization until birth.” Id. at 264. Clearly De
Jesus’ interpretation would hold that fertilized embryos, whether implanted or not, are
protected under the Declaration.
219. Id. at 265-66. This includes Nicaragua, Guatemala, El Salvador, and the
Dominican Republic. The IACHR has not explicitly endorsed the doctrine of margin
of appreciation as used in the ECHR, but it made reference to it in one case. See Eyal
Benvenisti, Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards, 31 N.Y.U. J.
INT’L L. & POL. 843, 844 n.5 (1999) (citing Proposed Amendments to the
Naturalizations Provisions of the Constitution of Costa Rica, Advisory Opinion OC4184, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 4 (Jan. 19, 1984), available at
http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/iachr.html)
(approving
“the margin of appreciation which is reserved to States when it comes to the
establishment of requirements for the acquisition of nationality and the determination
whether they have been complied with”).
220. See Kidanemariam, supra note 90, at 5-6.
221. See Artavia Murillo (“Fecundación in Vitro”) v. Costa Rica, Judgment, InterAm. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, ¶¶ 220-21 (Nov. 28, 2012).
222. Id. ¶ 244 (analyzing according to the Declaration, the AC, the UDHR, the
ICCPR, and the CRC).
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embryos as persons under the law.223
As there is at least one country in the Americas that is in defiance of the
decision in Artavia Murillo, the next section examines country-specific
laws in an attempt to understand how the region treats IVF and therefore
embryonic personhood. The next section also explores how some
countries’ treatment of IVF has changed or will change in the wake of the
Artavia Murillo case.
1. Country Studies in the Americas
At least one country, Costa Rica, has made an explicit pronouncement on
the application of the right to life standard to pre-implantation embryos.
Costa Rica currently does not allow IVF procedures because their
Constitutional Court in 2000 declared that the procedure violates the right
to life under Article 4(1) of the Declaration.224 Though the Constitutional
Court held that IVF violates the right to life because embryos are people
with legal protections,225 Costa Rica still allows abortion in limited cases
where the mother’s life or health is threatened.226 However, in the Artavia
Murillo case, the IACHR declared that Costa Rica’s ban on IVF is in
violation of the right to personal integrity, the right to personal liberty, the
right to private and family life, and the right to marry and raise a family.227
As of this writing, Costa Rica has not yet complied with the ultimate ruling
in Artavia Murillo which requires it to pass a law regulating and allowing
IVF.228 In December 2013, the Costa Rican Congress was poised to vote
223. Id. ¶¶ 247-256.
224. Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala. Const. marzo 15, 2002, Sentencia No. 2306-

00 (Costa Rica).
225. See generally Judgment No. 2000–002306, Supreme Court of Justice of Costa
Rica
(March
15,
2000),
available
at
http://sitios.poderjudicial.go.cr/salaconstitucional/Centro%20de%20Jurisprudencia/normas_declaradas_i
nconstitucion.htm#2000 (summarizing judgments of the Court); see also Fernando
Zegers-Hochschild et al., Human Rights to In Vitro Fertilization, 123 INT’L J.
GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 86, 87 (2013).
226. See Press Release, Ctr. for Reprod. Rts., Despite Country’s Own Laws, Costa
Rica Continues to Deny Women Legal Abortion (Aug. 23, 2013), available at
http://reproductiverights.org/en/press-room/despite-country%E2%80%99s-own-lawscosta-rica-continues-to-deny-women-legal-abortion; see also World Abortion Laws
Map, supra note 217. This also contradicts my earlier argument that states who grant
rights to embryos are less likely to then not grant those same rights to fetuses, and vice
versa. However, recent reports show that perhaps Costa Rica is not actually allowing
access to abortion in practice. Ctr. for Reprod. Rts., supra note 226.
227. See Artavia Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 ¶ 317.
228. See Alvaro Murillo, Un Año Sin Cumplir una Sentencia Sobre Fecundación
PAÍS
(Dec.
20,
2013,
6:18PM),
“In
Vitro,”
EL
http://sociedad.elpais.com/sociedad/2013/12/20/actualidad/1387560697_741825.html.
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on a law concerning the regulation of IVF.229 However, 12 members broke
the quorum, further delaying the vote and leaving Costa Rica without a law
regulating IVF.230 As a result, it is still currently illegal to pursue treatment
for IVF within Costa Rica.231
The rest of the countries in the Americas either openly allow or regulate
IVF, some at the national level, and many at more local levels.232
However, there is controversy within some countries due to inside actors
agitating for embryonic personhood. The most illustrative cases of this are
Argentina and the United States. In Argentina in 1999, a Buenos Aires
Court declared that personhood begins at conception, but local ART centers
refused to comply with or enforce the law, which included revealing the
number and parentage of all embryos in all Buenos Aires ART clinics.233
The clinics agreed among themselves not to take further action.234 When a
fine was later imposed, the clinics appealed the decision, citing patient
privacy rights and the preservation of patient-physician privilege.235
Subsequently in 2004, a Buenos Aires judge appointed a Catholic lawyer
to be the legal guardian of all the cryopreserved embryos in ten Buenos
The lawyer, Ricardo Rabinovich-Berkman,
Aires ART centers.236
believing that embryos are abandoned children, had been petitioning the
Buenos Aires courts since 1993 to protect the human rights of ART-created
embryos and fertilized eggs.237 However, through “a united refusal to
cooperate,” the ART centers in Buenos Aires rendered the rulings
ineffectual, and Rabinovich eventually stepped down as guardian of the
embryos.238 Therefore, although Buenos Aires courts ruled in 1999 that
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. However, Costa Rica has complied with the ancillary measures in the

court’s order, such as paying out compensation to the couples who originally brought
the suit and providing them with free psychological care. See Patricia Recio, 23
Parejas han Presentado Demandas Contra el Estado para No Permitir la FIV, LA
NACIÓN (Aug. 22, 2013, 5:21 PM), http://www.nacion.com/nacional/saludpublica/parejas-presentado-demandas-permitir-FIV_0_1361463958.html.
232. See Kelly Amanda Raspberry, Conflicted Conceptions: An Ethnography of
Assisted Reproduction Practices in Argentina 178-79 (May 2007) (unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill), available at
https://cdr.lib.unc.edu/content?id=uuid:748d6f41-9c8c-41d4-9246214552fe888c&ds=DATA_FILE.
233. Id. at 288-89.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 287.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 288, 292.
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life begins at conception, the ruling was never in force due to refusal by
local centers to cooperate.239 The law has since been considerably
liberalized. In 2010, the Buenos Aires provincial government passed Law
14.208, which guaranteed coverage of IVF procedures under the public
health system for certain populations.240
Moreover, the Argentinean Supreme Court issued a clarifying ruling in
March, 2012, declaring that abortion is permitted in cases of rape, while
also noting that abortion was already allowed where the life or health of the
mother is threatened.241 Argentina has also recently issued a direct
regulation of IVF at the national level, declaring that IVF treatments will be
free for all adults seeking to become parents.242 Although it is unclear what
direct relationship this has, if any, with the Artavia Murillo ruling,
Argentina is leading the way when it comes to what some have deemed
“the right to fertility.”243
In the United States, regulation is lacking and federal and state laws have
made multifarious pronouncements in the area. For example, in the case of
Davis v. Davis,244 a Tennessee court declared that a pre-embryo is accorded
respect – but is not a person.245 This is similar to a line of thinking about
embryos called the “Third Way,” as articulated by Lawrence J. Nelson and
Michael J. Meyer, whereby embryos, though not persons, are accorded
special respect because of their potential for human life.246
239. Id. at 288
240. Law No. 14.208, Provincia de Buenos Aires, Dec. 2, 2010, B.O. 26507(Arg.);

see also Decreto No. 2980/10, Provincia de Buenos Aires, Jan. 4, 2011, B.O. 26507
(Arg.). The law recognizes infertility as a disease as per criteria handed down by the
World Health Organization. See Martin Hevia & Carlos Herrera Vacaflor, The Legal
Status of In Vitro Fertilization in Latin America and the American Convention on
Human Rights, 36 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 51, 61 n.31 (2013). Hevia and
Vacaflor also state that the specific regulation is limited to women ages 30-40. Id.
241. See Jennifer Gurevich, Argentina Decriminalizes Abortion in Cases of Rape,
CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. (Mar. 19, 2012), http://reproductiverights.org/en/pressroom/argentina-decriminalizes-abortion-in-all-cases-of-rape (explaining that the law
was previously unclear in this area; however, Argentina did allow abortions in the case
of a rape of a mentally disabled person). Argentina also allows abortion when the life
or health of the mother is threatened. Id.
242. See Veronica Smink, Argentina, Pionero en el Derecho a la Fertilidad, BBC
MUNDO
(June
14,
2013),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/mundo/noticias/2013/06/130610_argentina_fertilidad_vs.shtml.
243. Id.
244. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596-97 (Tenn. 1992).
245. Id. at 596-97.
246. See Lawrence J. Nelson & Michael J. Meyer, Confronting Deep Moral
Disagreement: The President’s Council on Bioethics, Moral Status, and Human
Embryos, 5 AM. J. BIOETHICS 33, 33 (2005).
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In contrast to Tennessee, several states have advanced or are planning to
advance legislation granting personhood at conception.247 Because of
federal law governing abortion, state personhood legislation creates
questions of federalism regarding which governmental entity is allowed to
define life’s beginning. Since the federal government requires a hands-off
approach to abortion until up to 12 weeks of pregnancy (but allows states to
regulate abortion after twelve weeks and until viability248), allowing states
to define the beginning of life at conception has the potential to contravene
a woman’s ability to choose an abortion.249 Supreme Court precedent
declares that laws creating a substantial obstacle to a woman’s decision to
have an abortion before viability constitute an undue burden and are
therefore unconstitutional.250 Since defining an embryo as a person would
make abortion legally tantamount to willful murder, state personhood
statutes would effectively constitute an undue burden on a woman’s
decision to have an abortion. Therefore, embryonic personhood is
unconstitutional under current United States legal precedent, despite
attempts by states to advance it.251
The remaining Organization of American States countries hold varied
positions on embryonic personhood. In Chile, where abortion is illegal in
all circumstances,252 the ART community refers to very young fertilized
247. See, e.g., Emily Crockett, Colorado Fetal ‘Personhood’ Amendment Will Be
on 2014 Ballot, RH REALITY CHECK (Oct. 18, 2013, 3:08 PM),
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/10/18/colorado-fetal-personhood-amendmentwill-be-on-2014-ballot/; Robin Marty, Personhood Squelched in Alaska, Pops Up in
Iowa,
RH
REALITY
CHECK
(May
7,
2013,
12:12
PM),
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2013/05/07/personhood-squelched-in-alaska-pops-upin-iowa/; Robin Marty, Ohio AG Approves “Personhood” Amendment Language, RH
REALITY
CHECK
(Jan.
2,
2012,
8:47AM),
http://rhrealitycheck.org/article/2012/01/02/ohio-ag-approves-personhood-amendmentlanguage/.
247. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992); Madalene SmithHuemer, 6 States Where Reproductive Rights Will Be Under Attack in 2014, POLICY
MIC (Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.policymic.com/articles/78407/6-states-wherereproductive-rights-will-be-under-attack-in-2014.
248. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
249. Contra MICHELLE N. MEYER, THE NELSON A. ROCKEFELLER INST. OF GOV’T,
STATES’ REGULATION OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE TECHNOLOGIES: WHAT DOES THE
CONSTITUTION
ALLOW?
5
(2009),
available
at
http://www.rockinst.org/pdf/health_care/2009-07-States_Regulation_ART.pdf
(“[U]nder our Constitutional framework, states—and not the federal government—are
the most natural regulators of procreation.”).
250. Casey, 505 U.S. at 874.
251. See CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., supra note 136, at 11.
252. See Chile Abortion Laws: Senate Blocks Laws Lifting Ban on Abortions,
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embryos as “pre-embryos” to skirt pressure from the Catholic Church.253
However, the Chilean government does provide limited assistance to IVF
through its public health program.254 Ecuador’s Constitution also codifies a
complete ban on abortion, but IVF is unregulated and relatively
prevalent.255 Unlike Argentina and Chile, the IVF community in Ecuador
is not self-policing,256 and thus embryos have no apparent legal protection.
In Canada, the case of Winnipeg Child Family Services v. G257
established a legal precedent that a fetus is not a person and not entitled to
the rights afforded to a person.258 Though Canada’s regulation of IVF is
patchy at best and left largely to the provinces, there have been no
unequivocal pronouncements on embryonic personhood from any Canadian
governmental entities. Thus, it is fair to conclude that Canada does not
consider embryos as persons.
In conclusion, it seems that most parties to the IACHR would not grant
legal personhood to embryos. Additionally, the IACHR does not see life as
beginning at conception.259 Rather, the IACHR allows member states to
regulate abortion and IVF as they see fit, so long as the regulations are not
in contravention of other articles of the Convention. Moreover, the IACHR
has explicitly ruled that embryos are not persons,260 and that a total ban on
IVF is contrary to the human rights to privacy,261 to found a family,262 and
to reproductive autonomy.263
C. African Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR)
There is no case law available in the African Human Rights system that
addresses embryonic or fetal personhood. However, there are a few cases
ASSOCIATED
PRESS
(April
5,
2012,
3:26
PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/04/05/chile-abortion-laws-bills-lifting-banblocked_n_1406606.html; see also World Abortion Laws Map, supra note 217.
253. See Elizabeth F.S. Roberts, Institutions That Matter: IVF, Abortion and
Reproductive Governance in Ecuador, STATES AT REGIONAL RISK, available at
http://sarr.emory.edu/documents/Andes/Roberts.pdf.
254. See Smink, supra note 242.
255. See Roberts, supra note 253, at 6.
256. Id.
257. Winnipeg Child Family Servs. v. G, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 925 (Can.).
258. Id.
259. Artavio Murillo (“Fecundación in Vitro”) vs. Costa Rica, Judgment, Inter-Am.
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, ¶ 138 (Nov. 28, 2012).
260. Id. at ¶ 221.
261. Id. at ¶¶ 146, 150, 285.
262. Id. at ¶¶ 150.
263. Id. at ¶¶ 144, 150.
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that may be useful in determining the stance of African countries toward
embryonic personhood. In the case of Republic of Kenya v. Nyamu,264 the
Kenyan High Court ruled that children are only considered “persons” under
the law when they “[proceed] in a living state from [their] mother.”265
South Africa’s Constitutional Court ruled similarly in The State v.
Mushumpa and Best,266 ruling that a fetal death due to assault may
aggravate a crime, but that killing the fetus itself is not murder.267 The
Court noted that this determination would involve complicated questions of
when a fetus becomes a person, thus further indicating that the Court
believes that there is some stage where the fetus is not a person.268
In 2003, the ACHPR made an explicit pronouncement on abortion. The
Protocol on the Rights of Women in Africa, adopted by the ACHPR in
2003, is the first human rights document to include a right to abortion.269
Since this human rights body permits abortion, it is unlikely they would
then grant personhood to an embryo only to take away that personhood
once it becomes a fetus. It remains to be seen how this decision might
affect both fetal and embryonic personhood, especially as IVF becomes
more widely available in African countries.
V. BIOETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Some may argue that international bodies have sufficiently addressed
IVF technologies, thus precluding the need for an explicitly “human-rights”
related pronouncement on IVF. However, UN bodies have begun to
confront bioethics questions involving embryos in the context of medical
research,270 and one cannot ignore the connection between IVF and
bioethics.271 As it stands, one of the great questions in bioethics in the
264. See Case No. 81 of 2004 (Kenya High Court); CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., LEGAL
GROUNDS: REPRODUCTIVE AND SEXUAL RIGHTS IN AFRICAN COMMONWEALTH
COURTS,
VOLUME
II
101
(2010),
available
at
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/pub_legalground
s_vol2_2.10.pdf [hereinafter CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., LEGAL GROUNDS].
265. Id.
266. See State v. Mashumpa 2008 (1) SACR 126 (E) at ¶ 62 (S. Afr.). See generally
CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., LEGAL GROUNDS, supra note 264, at 98-99.
267. Mashumpa, 2008 (1) SACR at ¶¶ 62-63.
268. Id.
269. See Rachel Rebouché, Health and Reproductive Rights in the Protocol to the
African Charter: Competing Influences and Unsettling Questions, 16 WASH. & LEE J.
CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 79, 105 (2009).
270. Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights, U.N. EDUC., SCI., AND
CULTURAL
ORGANIZATION
(2005),
http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=31058&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
271. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Nelson & Michael J. Meyer, Confronting Deep Moral
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United States is what to do with cryopreserved embryos in a research
context.272 In addressing these questions, ethics councils have issued
various statements on just what sort of respect to accord the human
embryo.273
The Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights (UDBHR)274
makes no explicit pronouncement about respect for embryos. Granted, the
UDBHR is meant to cover all fields of bioethics, and as such it would be
impossible to address the ethical concerns of each area. However, it is
telling that the UDBHR makes several references to “human beings”—
respect for, privacy of, consent of, among others.275 Additionally, the
UDBHR notes that the development of new technologies must contribute to
“justice, equity, and to the interest of humanity,” and further states that
paying attention to the position of women is an important barometer for
determining “social realities.”276
This language is promising. It seems as though human rights
pronouncements related to bioethics thus emphasize human beings –
particularly women, who are most often affected by embryonic
personhood277 – and not reproductive materials as those entities most
affected by bioethics. While bioethics and IVF cannot be fully conflated,
the UDBHR can serve as an important reference point for including IVF
considerations where they should belong—in conversations about life,
privacy, non-discrimination, and the “reproductive rights” umbrella.
VI. ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
Most human rights bodies have implied or directly pronounced that
neither fetuses nor embryos have existing rights as persons. Using the

Disagreement: The President’s Council on Bioethics, Moral Status, and Human
Embryos, 5 AM. J. OF BIOETHICS 33 (2005); Francoise Shenfield, et al., European
Society of Human Reproduction and Embryology Task Force on Ethics and Law, The
Moral Status of the Pre-Implantation Embryo, 16 HUM. REPROD. 1046 (2001).
272. See Shenfield et al., supra note 148, at 1047.
273. See, e.g., id.
274. United Nations Educational, Sci., and Cultural Org. Universal Declaration on
Bioethics and Human Rights, (Oct. 19, 2005), http://portal.unesco.org/en/ev.phpURL_ID=31058&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html.
275. Id.
276. Id.
277. Although embryonic personhood affects everyone involved in childbearing
and childrearing, because women are disproportionately involved in the IVF process,
and because women are more likely than men to seek out procedures such as abortion,
in which embryonic personhood is also implicated, I posit that women, more so than
other groups, are most affected by embryonic personhood.
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principle that human rights law would be unlikely to grant rights to
reproductive materials at an early stage, take them away again, and then regrant them at birth, embryonic personhood would be a violation of already
existing human rights norms. This conclusion is important when
considering rights of access for infertile278 couples and individuals to
burgeoning technologies such as IVF. In these cases, personhood
legislation would likely cause considerable complications for the IVF
process.279 One major complication would be the preclusion of embryonic
destruction: whether due to disinterest or due to an already successful IVF
procedure.280
If analyzed in the context of the way the human rights system has treated
abortion, the very idea of embryonic personhood is incompatible with the
right to privacy and the right to life.281 Similar to the way that granting a
fetus personhood abrogates a person’s autonomy to decide whether or not
to carry a pregnancy to term, embryonic personhood would also abrogate
this autonomy.282 Courts have already made various pronouncements
respecting a woman’s right to privacy and life in reproductive health
decisions.283 Logically, they can and will do the same with respect to
embryonic personhood, which strongly implicates reproductive decisions,
just as the IACHR chose to do.284
278.
279.
280.
281.

In all its permutations – medical, social, and elective.
See, e.g., Pittman, supra note 10, at 101-04.
Id. at 100.
Because personhood rights threaten abortion rights, it is also arguable that
under human rights law they similarly threaten a woman’s right to health. See Zampas
& Gher, supra note 15, at 252.
282. Cf. CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS., supra note 136, at 14.
283. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (“[T]his right of privacy . . .
is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy.”); see also R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] S.C.R. 30, 32-33 (Can.) (noting that
the criminalization of abortion interferes with a woman’s bodily integrity and security
of person); Corte Constitucional [C.C.] [Constitutional Court], mayo 10, 2006,
§
II
(1)
(Colom.),
available
at
Sentencia
C-355/06,
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2006/C-355-06.htm (noting that the
decision to have a child falls within the privacy sphere); Rex v. Bourne, (1938) 1 K.B.
687, 695 (U.K.); Artavia Murillo (“Fecundación in Vitro”) v. Costa Rica, Judgment,
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257, ¶¶ 146, 150, 281, 285, (Nov. 28, 2012)
(concluding that a ban on IVF violates privacy and reproductive autonomy); K.L. v.
Peru, Judgment U.N. Human Rights Comm., No. 1153/2003, ¶ 6.4, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/85/D/1153/2003
(2005),
available
at
http://reproductiverights.org/sites/crr.civicactions.net/files/documents/KL%20HRC%2
0final%20decision.pdf (noting that Peru’s failure to allow K.L. to have an abortion was
a privacy violation).
284. See Artavia Murillo, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 ¶ 244.
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The IACHR ruled that laws based on embryonic personhood outlawing
IVF violate the right to found a family.285 In the sense of IVF, as the
IACHR noted, the right to found a family is closely tied to the right to
enjoy the benefits of scientific progress.286 Here, science has made possible
a way for infertile couples and individuals to become genetic parents.
Thus, it is a violation of human rights law to say that embryonic
personhood precludes access to IVF.287 Therefore, where embryonic
personhood justifications are used to limit or ban IVF, the right to found a
family is violated.
The right to non-discrimination may be less readily invoked regarding
embryonic personhood. Though the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights has implied that non-discrimination may be implicated if
infertility is considered a disability,288 human rights bodies should be able
to declare discrimination against infertile people using infertility as a
characteristic in its own right, separate from disability. The idea of
discrimination is based on equal treatment under the law, and it is
unnecessary to put infertility in the disability box in order to find a
violation of the right to non-discrimination where access to IVF is
obstructed by the state. Thus, embryonic personhood in and of itself is
discriminatory against infertile people, regardless of infertility’s
classification as a disability.
Finally, embryonic personhood violates reproductive autonomy, and the
treatment of embryonic personhood by the courts should note this fact. The
IACHR ruled that precluding access to IVF abrogates the reproductive
autonomy of infertile couples by taking away a choice to become genetic
parents where that choice should be available.289 The Court further held
that reproductive rights are paramount in considering the effects of a ban
Reproductive justice requires that the existence of a
on IVF.290
reproductive right be coupled with access to that right.291 For those who

285.
286.
287.
288.

See id. at ¶¶ 146, 150.
See id. at ¶ 150.
See id. at ¶¶ 146, 150.
See id. at ¶ 138 (quoting Representative Molina of the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights who was quoted in the decision as saying that infertility
qualifies as a disability, and that the infertile couples in this case were discriminated
against for their infertility-disability. The Court does not affirm this statement, but
merely acknowledges that it was made).
289. See id. at ¶¶ 143-50.
290. See id. at ¶¶ 152-54.
291. See What is RJ/Why is Reproductive Justice Important for Women of Color?,
SISTER
SONG,
http://www.sistersong.net/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=141&Ite
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wish to procreate using IVF, reproductive justice is denied and
reproductive rights are violated where access to IVF is obstructed or taken
away, especially where embryonic personhood is used as a justification.
The idea of embryonic personhood further endangers other reproductive
rights, such as abortion.292
International human rights bodies and individual countries must take
their cues from the IACHR and address IVF technologies in their
conception of other rights tied to reproduction. Embryonic personhood,
while not explicitly addressed by human rights treaties or treaty bodies
aside from the IACHR, should be discouraged under international human
rights law. The implications of embryonic personhood on the right to life,
privacy, the right to found a family, the right to non-discrimination, and
reproductive rights are sweeping, and it is important that international
human rights law continues to recognize human beings, and not their
reproductive materials, as rights-bearers under the law.

mid=81 (last visited Apr. 21, 2014).
292. See Ed Goldman, The Conflict Between Fetal Personhood Laws and Women’s
Rights, JURIST (Nov. 17, 2011), http://jurist.org/forum/2011/11/ed-goldmanpersonhood-laws.php (discussing the legal implications for personhood laws in the
United States).
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